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NOTES

DOES THE "PRIORITIES AND MATERIAL ALLOCATIONS
ACT" OFFEND TE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE?
To the end that an ever-increasing military might be adequately and
quickly supplied with modem arms and materiel of war, Congress
recently passed the so-called "Priorities and Material Allocations Act."'
This act has as its purpose the prevention of competition between production for civilian consumption and production for national defense.
It is emergency legislation designed for the single paramount purpose
of transforming a peacetime industrial economy to a wartime producing machine. As amended May 31, 1941, the Act provides in part:
"... all other naval contracts or orders and all Army contracts
or orders shall, in the discretion of the President, take priority
over all deliveries for private account or export 2 ... Deliveries
of material to which priority may be assigned ... shall include,
in addition to deliveries of material under contracts or orders of
the Army or Navy, delivery of materials under-. . . (B) contracts or orders which the President shall deem necessary or
appropriate to the defense of the United States.-(C) . . . No

person, firm, or corporation shall be held liable for damages or
penalties for any default under any contract or order which
shall result directly or indirectly from his compliance
3 with any
rule, regulation, or order issued under this section."
It is the purpose of this inquiry to consider and discuss problems
of constitutional nature which this statute brings to the fore.
The Federal Constitution expressly prohibits the states from passing any law impairing the obligation of contracts. 4 Does the Constitution impose any similar restriction on the Federal Government? Article
V of the Amendments to the Constitution provides, "No person shall
be... deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law;
nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." In Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Company V.
Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry., 5 the United States Supreme Court
said, "The Constitution ... does not in terms prohibit Congress from
impairing the obligation of contracts as it does the state. But as far
back as Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 368, it was said that among other acts
which Congress could not pass without exceeding its authority was 'a
law that destroys or impairs the lawful private contracts of citizens'."
Contract rights are property rights. 6 Valid contracts are property
and as such protected from being taken without just compensation,
141 U.S.C.A., 1941 Supp., p. 144.

U.S.C.A., 1941 Supp., p. 144-5, § 2 (a) (1).
U.S.C.A., 1941 Supp., p. 145, § 2 (a) (2).
4 U. S. Const., Art. I, § 10.
5
294 U.S. 648, 79 L.ed. 1110 (1934).
6
Lynch v. U. S., 292 U.S. 571, 54 Sup. Ct. 840, 78 L.ed. 1434 (1933); Omnia
Commercial Co. v. U. S., 261 U.S. 502, 43 Sup. Ct. 437, 67 L.ed. 773 (1923).
241
3 41
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whether the obligor be a private individual, a municipality, a state or
the United States. 7 The Priorities Act by its terms takes away the
damages remedy for breach of contract. Does the Act seek to impair
the obligation of contracts, and as such take away "private property
without due process of law or without just compensation" in contravention of the Constitutional provision?
Manifestly, the Act takes away a legal remedy which would otherwise be available to the party whose contract has been defaulted by a
corporation or firm in giving government contracts priority. The statute
thus in its terms and operation takes away the remedy or the means
of enforcing the contract which the contractors relied upon if they
entered into it before the Act was passed. In White v. Hart," the
Supreme Court stated, "'Nothing can be more material to the obligation than the means of enforcement.'9 Without the remedy, the contract may indeed, in the sense of the law, be said not to exist, and its
obligation to fall within the class of those moral and social duties,
which depend for their fulfillment wholly upon the will of the individual. The ideas of validity and remedy are inseparable and both
are parts of the obligation which is guaranteed by the constitution
against invasion."
It is well to note that in order for the government to become liable
for the payment of compensation for taking of private property for
public use there must be a "taking" of the contract and not a mere
requisition of the subject matter. This was so declared to be the law
in Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States.10 The plaintiff in that case
brought action against the Federal Government, claiming a right to
compensation because the government, by requisitioning the steel output of the Allegheny Steel Co. for the year 1918, had prevented the
fulfillment of plaintiff's contract with that company for steel plate.
The Court, speaking through Justice Sutherland, said, "In exercising
the power to requisition, the Government dealt only with the Steel
Company, which thereupon became liable to deliver its product to the
Government, by virtue of the statute and in response to the order.
As a result of this lawful government action the performance of the
contract was rendered impossible. It was not appropriated but ended."'"
7

Lynch v. U. S., supra, note 6; Union Pac. Ry. v. U. S., 99 U.S. 700, 25 L.ed.
496 (1878); U. S.v. Northern Pac. Ry., 256 U.S. 51, 41 Sup. Ct. 439, 65 L.ed.
825 (1920); Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665, 32 Sup. Ct. 565, 56 L.ed. 941 (1911).
813 Wall. 646 (U.S. 1871); See also, Bank of Minden v. Clement, 256 U.S.
126, 41 Sup. Ct. 408, L.ed. 857 (1920) ; Home Bldg. & Loan Assoc. v. Blaisdell,
290 U.S. 398, 54 Sup. Ct. 231, 78 L.ed. 413, 88 A.L.R. 1481 (1934) ; Lynch v.
U. S., supra, note 6.
9 Van Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 4 Wall. 535, 552 (U.S. 1866).
10 Supra, note 6.
"1Omnia Commercial Co. v. U. S., 261 U.S. 502, 43 Sup. Ct. 437, 67 L.ed. 773
(1923).
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The Court held that the subject matter of the contract was taken, and
not the contract. Having the power to take the subject matter the
government was not liable simply because its action rendered performance of the contract impossible.
The situation presented by the Priorities Act is different from that
in the Omnia case. The Act does not seek to appropriate the physical
property of the manufacturer contractor, but, by attaching priority to
government contracts and by taking away the remedy of the party
whose contract has thus been defaulted because of this priority, it
strikes directly at the obligation of the contract itself.
In determining that there was no acquisition of the contract and
hence no taking of private property for public use in the Omnia case,"
the court stated, "What was here requisitioned was the future product
of the Steel Company, and, since this product in the absence of governmental interference would have been delivered in fulfillment of the
contract, the contention seems to be that the contract was so far
identified with it that the taking of the former, ipso facto, took the latter. This, however is to confound the contract with its subject-matter.
The essence of every executory contract is the obligation which the
law imposes upon the parties to perform it. 'It (the contract) may be
defined to be a transaction between two or more persons, in which
each party comes under an obligation to the other, and each reciprocally acquires a right to whatever is promised by the other.'-13 The
court thus indicates that the test as to whether private property is
being taken in the case of a contract is whether or not the obligation
is sought to be extinguished or appropriated by the government through
legislative fiat. Applying this criterion to the Priorities Act, it would
seem that that is just what the statute attempts to accomplish. By taking
away the remedy it is extinguishing the obligation of the contract and
is taking the contract for public use. This would seem to be a clear
contravention of the terms of the Constitution, and unless the Act
can be justified on some general principle of government or sovereignty, it would seem to be unconstitutional.
Obviously the Act is emergency legislation .In an emergency the
government may exercise powers which it does not exercise in tranquil times. 14 This is not to say that the government can employ unconstitutional means to preserve constitutional government. But the government in order to defend itself from destruction by external foes may,
it would seem, use the property of its citizens in a manner which in
peaceful times it could not constitutionally do. In times of emergency
the property of citizens, which under ordinary conditions is clothed
2

Iden.

13 Dartmouth
14

College v. Woodward, 4 Wheaton 518, 629, 656 (U.S. 1819).
2Home Bldg. & Loan Association v. Blaisdell, supra, note 8.
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with only a private interest takes on a public character. To prevent
the spreading of fires, for instance, property may be destroyed without compensation to the owner. 15 What justification can be advanced
for this, other than that the property destroyed has assumed a public
character because its continuance endangers the public safety? So in
like manner may private contracts of citizens obstruct the effective
promotion of national defense and endanger the public safety. In
order for our country to compete successfully in war with totalitarian
powers, it is necessary that the entire state be geared for war. This
is impossible if private contracts for production of goods monopolize
the major industrial facilities of the nation. Such contracts become
an obstruction to the furtherance of national safety.
Every sovereign power, whether constitutionally enfranchised or
otherwise, possesses what is sometimes called the police power.: 6 This
power indeed is the latent power of sovereignty. It has been described
as the law of necessity and as being coextensive with the necessities
of the case and the safeguard of public interest.17 That the Federal
Government has this power was decided as far back as McCulloch v.
Maryland.'8 The Federal government possesses whatever police power
is appropriate to the exercise of any attribute of sovereignty specifically granted to it by the Constitution. The powers granted by the
Constitution to the Federal government include the authority to wage
war and provide for the common defense. 19 In order to give effect to
the exercise of these powers the Constitution grants Congress the
20
right to pass any laws necessary and proper to carry them into effect.

Does this power extend to the government's condemning private property that hampers or frustrates the exercise of this sovereign right?
Is the government's right of self-protection conditioned upon the necessity of conforming with the Fifth Amendment? In the words of the
Supreme Court: "It is also settled beyond dispute that the Constitution is not self destructive. In other words, that the powers which it
confers on the one hand it does not immediately take away on the
other...

"21

This was said of the taxing power. Having been granted

in express terms, the Court held this power was not taken away by
the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. As the Supreme
Court put it in another case, "The Constitution does not conflict with
itself by conferring upon the one hand a taxing power and taking the
15 Bowditch v. Boston, 101 U.S. 16 (1879) ; See Ferry v. Campbell, 110 Ia. 290,
81 N.W. 604, 50 L.R.A. 92 (1900) ; In re Jacobs, 98 N.Y. 98, 50 Am. St. Rep.
636 (1885).
16 See 11 Am. Jur., Con. Law, § 245, and cases there cited.
1 Camfield v. U. S., 167 U.S. 518 (1897).
184 Wheat. 316, 4 L.ed. 579 (1819) ; See also 11 Am. Jur., Con. Law, § 257.
19 U. S. Const., Art. 1, § 8.
20
21

Idem.

Billings v. U. S., 232 U.S. 261, 282 (1914).

19421

NOTES

same power away on the other by the limitations of the due process
22
clause."
Similarly, it may be said that since the power has been expressly
given to Congress to prosecute war and provide for the common defense, Congress also has the power to pass all laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying those express powers into execution. The due process clause does not take away this power.
There are many laws the wisdom and justice of which is little
questioned, which injuriously affect the value of or destroy property,
but for which no remedy is afforded, as for example restrictions
on the height and character of buildings, destruction of diseased cattle, trees and the like. In these cases the fact that all property is
held subject to the condition that it does not endanger the public
welfare furnishes the justification. There can logically be little difference between destroying cattle and trees to prevent contagion and
destroying private contracts to prevent conquest of the nation by foreign foes. Salus populi suprema lex is one of the foundation principles
of all civil government. At present the safety of the nation is actively
and perilously threatened by a combination of aggressive world powers. The safety of the people demands that every resource be mustered
in defense of the realm. It is not a conjectural question whether or not
complete organization of industry to war production is necessary; it is
an indisputable fact. Success in modern warfare is dependent ultimately on the producing power of the countries involved. The peacetime industry of the country must be converted into wartime industry
with the utmost dispatch. This would be an impossible achievement
were the government forced to requisition every private contract which
hampers the war effort and pay compensation for the destruction of it.
In Louisville & Nat. R. R. v. Mottley, 23 the court, quoting from the
Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 550 (U.S. 1870), said, "as, in a state of
civil society, property of a citizen or subject is ownership, subject to
the lawful demands of the sovereign, so contracts must be understood
as made in reference to the possible exercise of the rightful authority
of the government, and no obligation of a contract can extend to the
defeat of legitimate government authority." The government through
the Priorities Act is exercising the authority granted to it by the Constitution in Art. 1, Sec. 8 to provide for the common defense. Having
the authority the government must also have the means. That means
is the property of its citizens.
An indication of the Supreme Court's attitude on a question such
as that considered here may be gathered from a dictum statement in
22

Brushaber v. Union Pac. Ry., 240 U.S. 1, 24 (1915).
U.S. 467, 55 L.ed. 297 (1910).

23 219
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Justhe recent case of United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corporation.
tice Black, speaking for the Court said, "We cannot regard the government of the United States at war as so powerless that it must seek
the organization of a private corporation as a helpless suppliant. The
Constitution, Art. 1, Sec. 8 grants to Congress power 'to raise and
support Armies,' 'to provide and maintain a Navy,' and to make all
laws necessary and proper to carry these powers into execution.
Under this authority Congress can draft men for battle service.

. . . Its power to draft business organizations to support the fight25
ing men who risk their lives can be no less."
GEORGE

2462 Sup. Ct. 581 (1942).
2562

Sup. Ct. 581, 589, 590 (1942).
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